Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the First World War could have gone completely as planned. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen’s plan.

Blitz War Plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning for a major war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, clearly harbored plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war in these conditions

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was supposed to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For final victory – 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short period of time. After the victory over France, German troops will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying the famous phrase: “We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg.”

Failure of the Schlieffen Plan

Helmuth von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen as chief of the German General Staff, accepted the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it excessively risky. And for this reason, I subjected it to thorough revision. In particular, he refused to concentrate the main forces of the German army on the western front and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to envelop the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but were also able to deliver a powerful counterattack.

The reliance on the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. The invasion of East Prussia by Russian troops literally stunned the German command. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to Barbarossa's plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
Number	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29th Division + Army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kyiv. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be viewed as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to capture the Soviet Union. What made the idea unique was its time frame. It was assumed that the capture would last no more than five months. The development of this document was approached very responsibly; not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the intended goals, it was necessary to attract maximum resources, including mental ones. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with various assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely free its hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from intervening.
The European continent was firmly concentrated in the hands of Adolf, but he wanted more. Moreover, he understood perfectly well that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but he had interests in Europe and, in order to eliminate any attempts, it was necessary to eliminate an undesirable rival in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union even before he could end the war he started against Great Britain. This was going to be the fastest company of all time to conquer a huge territory in such a short time. German ground forces were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will be required to fully provide any necessary support to cover and protect its warfighters. Any actions that are planned to be carried out on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with established interests in capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at carefully preparing a lightning takeover against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's main mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying for several decades the situation with the development and implementation of the plan for the instant capture of the Union, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurousness and meaninglessness of this idea. The fascist generals also assessed the plan. They considered it his main, one might say fatal, mistake - the Fuhrer’s keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to take action in the fall of 1940, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive manic idea of ​​​​establishing complete world domination and the crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that it was constantly retreated from. Hitler changed his instructions several times, causing valuable time to be lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of the Soviets. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces had been used, the consequences of the war could have been completely different, and history would now be written completely differently. At the time of the offensive, some of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the plan

He believed that the important point was the ability to defeat ground forces through active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation solely as dividing existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to leave the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, and also create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the first priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in the battles.
Directions were given for complete secrecy regarding future acts of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions to prepare for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that the whole country was closely involved in preparations, and only a few knew what exactly was going to happen and what specific tasks were assigned to the fascist army.

Bottom line

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with Hitler's consent when he began to retreat from his intended goals. For the entire Russian people, this is a huge plus; we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instant conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all its goals. One can only be glad that the commanders-in-chief of the German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.

On September 5, the high command of the German armed forces issued order No. 35 to prepare an attack on Moscow. It was planned to be applied after the implementation of the main previous steps. Blitz operations in Ukraine were of particular importance in Hitler's plans. Only after their successful completion at the end of September and beginning of October was it planned to move on to the most important thing - the attack on Moscow. It is no coincidence that in the summer of 1941 the Nazis concentrated their main forces on the southern front.

Careful preparation for a strike on the capital

According to Hitler’s initial assumptions, the capital of the USSR was supposed to fall in September, but subsequently no one chose to return to the goals loudly proclaimed at the beginning. Indeed, according to some of the most optimistic forecasts, Moscow was planned to be captured during July. In the second half of September, on the occasion of the three-month anniversary of the opening of the Eastern Front, the successes of the German army and its allies were actively recalled everywhere. However, the real situation at the front was by no means rosy. September was coming to an end, and the Wehrmacht soldiers never marched through the streets of Leningrad or the streets of Moscow. The July directives on a breakthrough through Rostov to the Caucasus and the Volga were not implemented either. Despite the initially rapid advance, the Nazis failed to break the spirit and combat effectiveness of the Red Army, and they failed to win the sympathy of the majority of the Soviet people. As it soon turned out, the estimates of the Red Army's reserves for further battles were also extremely erroneous. The sixth of September was a very important day in Hitler's Wolf's Lair. It was then that the adjutant handed Hitler a folder with order number 35. This was a detailed plan for further actions against the Soviet army, which was supposed to finally and irrevocably decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front in favor of Hitler’s army. Already on the same day, the commanders received orders to prepare for an operation against the army of General Timoshenko. Only after the defeat of the main part of the Soviet army was Army Group Center supposed to begin pursuing the retreating Soviet troops in the direction of Moscow. In preparation for the decisive clash, all aspects were worked out to the smallest detail, including plans for the delivery of ammunition, ammunition, transport, provisions and the formation of new divisions. All the necessary tasks included a precise time plan for the strike on Moscow to be a real success. On the detailed map of the Eastern Front in Hitler's bunker, all events were marked with all the appropriate signs: the concentration of troops, their advance, the current situation, a review of reserves and expected new attacks as part of planned operations. Already at the beginning of September, Hitler also discussed among his closest associates the next plans for the occupied territory of the USSR. Then he literally said the following: “When the Russian territories are settled by the peasants of the Reich, they must live in the best, most beautiful houses. German institutions should be located in the most beautiful buildings, Reich Commissioners - in palaces. Around the cities at a distance of 30 - 40 kilometers there will be comfortable villages connected to each other by excellent roads. Next there will be a different world in which we will let the Russians live the way they want. The main thing is that we will control them. In the event of a revolution, it is enough to drop a few bombs on their cities, and everything will be fine. What India is for England, the eastern territories will be for us. We will send Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, and Dutch to Siberia to help. We will carry out the planned racial policy. We will no longer allow a single German to leave Europe for England. We will not drain the swamps, but will take only the best land. We will set up extensive military training grounds in the marshy areas.”

Tremendous power at work

For the main attack on Moscow, Hitler attracted 1.6 million people and the most modern technology. A large-scale attack on the Soviet capital began on October 2, 1941. Subsequently, Soviet generals stated that on some days the advance of enemy forces was so rapid that even the General Staff did not believe it. At first glance, the situation on the central sector of the front was developing very favorably for the Wehrmacht. Already on the third of October Oryol was captured. A day later, Soviet units were surrounded near Bryansk. Over the next two days Yukhnov was busy. During this period, Hitler waited every day for Soviet surrender, but it never happened. In mid-October, the Wehrmacht reached the Moscow defense zone. However, each subsequent day proved that progress was slowing down. On the one hand, there was the influence of the weather, and on the other hand, there was also a deterioration in the supply of the advancing troops. On October 24, reports came from the front that part of the German troops were only 60 kilometers from Moscow. Off-road progress became increasingly difficult, and the number of soldiers who fell ill due to the cold and insufficient uniforms and food grew. So the Nazis were forced to quickly build underground bunkers to escape harsh weather and fire from Soviet positions. At the end of October, Marshal von Bock decided to launch the final offensive on the first day of November in order to enter Moscow on the seventh of November - the day of an important Soviet public holiday. However, the Supreme Command did not give the necessary consent, but on the contrary, ordered no offensive actions to be taken in the near future.

When the German Army Group Center launched an offensive on the defensive lines near Rzhev and Vyazma on October 2, the goal was to capture Moscow by October 12 (this deadline has changed more than once since the beginning of Hitler’s eastern campaign). To achieve this goal, the Germans brought in almost half the divisions from the entire Eastern Front, 75% of tanks and more than a thousand aircraft. This was a truly enormous force, and it was clear that Hitler had put everything on one card and was really going to take the Soviet capital at any cost. After three days of fierce fighting, German forces still managed to break through the defenses on both sides of Vyazma, but the Germans encountered more resistance than expected. Kaluga was taken on October 12, Kalinin fell two days later, and Maloyaroslavets fell four days later. The very next day a state of siege was declared in Moscow. The diplomatic corps and government were ordered to evacuate to Kuibyshev. The General Staff and Politburo remained reduced in strength in Moscow. Large factories that worked for defense, scientific and cultural institutions were also taken away. On the approaches to Moscow, barricades and anti-tank fortifications were built at a rapid pace. The German attack was stopped on October 22 near Mtsensk, but the very next day it resumed in the northwest of the city and advanced towards Tula. But the Nazis failed to take it. The last German success of this period was the capture of Volokolamsk. Further off-road advance against fortified defenses became impossible. The fascist high command became more and more nervous every day. The majority of German generals did not hide their opinion that in the current situation the Fuhrer's orders for a further offensive were impossible to carry out. Thus, at the end of October, the first battle for Moscow practically ends. Despite the fact that in the middle of the month the situation was developing more than favorably for the Wehrmacht, and was taking a critical turn for the defenders of Moscow, the German troops failed to achieve their goal. After the war, Marshal Zhukov stated that the most critical situation was in the period from October 6 to October 13.

Vain expectation of Soviet surrender

In Germany, mainly during October, optimism reigned. Fascist propaganda reported more and more successes on the Eastern Front. People were told that the USSR was teetering on the brink of an inevitable catastrophe, and that Stalin would soon capitulate. On October 2, in a daily address addressed to German soldiers on the Eastern Front, Hitler declared: “In just a few weeks, the three largest industrial areas of the Bolsheviks will be completely in our hands. We have finally created all the conditions for a powerful final blow that will destroy the enemy before the onset of winter. All the preparation that could have been done has already been completed. This time we carried it out systematically, step by step, to put the enemy in a position in which we could deal a fatal blow to him. Today begins the final, great and decisive battle of this year.” Just a day later, Hitler again addressed his soldiers with these words: “Forty-eight hours ago new operations of gigantic proportions began. They will lead to the destruction of our enemy in the east. The enemy has already been completely defeated, and he will never regain his strength.” German authorities increasingly talked about the final defeat of the USSR. The imperial press chief Dietrich did not lag behind, and on October 9 he stated the following verbatim: “Gentlemen, any decision of the German High Command is always implemented, no matter what the resistance. The new successes of German weapons prove that the outcome of the military campaign to the east is already predetermined. In the military sense of the word, Soviet Russia was already defeated. You cannot blame me for ever giving you erroneous information. Therefore, today I vouch with my good name for the veracity of this news.” Just on October 9, all Nazi radio stations and newspapers reported that the war in the east was almost over. On that day, Hitler also confidently declared that although the German troops still faced quite difficult battles, the peak had already been overcome, and the war in the east would be crowned with victory, which would soon become obvious. However, in the following days the opposite happened, and Hitler soon had to regret his words. In the weeks that followed, events no longer developed favorably for the German forces. Lack of preparation for harsh winter conditions and underestimation of Soviet combat capability and reserves played a fatal role for the Nazis. As early as October 10, the main Nazi newspaper published an article on the front page entitled “The Great Hour Has Come! The outcome of the war in the east is predetermined! " At the same time, the Soviet press conveyed completely different information. For example, on October 8, Red Star published an editorial in which the German offensive was called a last desperate attempt. Allegedly, Hitler threw all the forces he had at her, including outdated and small tanks that fell into the hands of the Germans after the capture of Belgium, Holland and France. The article also stated that the Soviet soldier must destroy these tanks at any cost, be they old or new, large or small. All the old armored vehicles from all over Europe, which have long been scrapped, are now sent to fight the Soviet Union.

Context

The Battle of Moscow: How Hitler Almost Defeated Stalin

Newsweek 09/05/2007

What decided the outcome of the Battle of Moscow in 1941

Die Welt 12/14/2013

Archives: The Germans suffered huge losses in the Battle of Moscow

The Times 12/22/2011

The Forgotten Battle of Moscow

Kaleva 05/12/2005
On October 13, news about the capture of Moscow and Stalin’s request for a truce spread around Germany. Film magazines competed to see who could best tell about the approaching victory over the USSR. Despite the unfavorable weather and ubiquitous mud, German troops are rapidly advancing towards Moscow, and its residents can already hear the noise of the approaching front. However, October, which started so well for the Nazis, was not marked by the declared successes, and therefore the victorious fanfare gradually quietly disappeared from the press and radio. In addition, in October the cold made itself known with certainty. There were frosts at night, and during the day the soil turned into an impassable mess. Back in mid-October, the situation for the Wehrmacht was quite favorable, but the advance began to noticeably stall until it finally stopped. The desire of the German generals to walk along Red Square on November 7 turned out to be too bold and far from reality.

Second Battle of Moscow

But the Nazis were not going to give up their goals so easily. Already at the beginning of November, they began a new regrouping of forces for another, as they themselves believed, this time the final striking blow on Moscow. In mid-November, Army Group Center prepared 73 divisions (14 tank divisions). Hitler's generals planned to surround the city from the north and south and defeat the Soviet forces west of Moscow. A new attack on the capital began on November 15. On November 19, the Germans captured the important city of Istra, and four days later - Klin and Solnechnogorsk. Stalinogorsk was occupied on November 20. But in this extremely difficult situation in Moscow there was no defeatist mood. On November 6, a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council was held in the lobby of the Moscow metro. Stalin acknowledged the Soviet defeats, but at the same time recalled the failure of Hitler's plans for a lightning war. Stalin attributed the military defeats, first of all, to an insufficient number of aircraft and tanks, and this in a situation where there was no second front. Territorial conquests, according to Stalin, were due to the fact that the Germans managed to seize the industrial bases of some European states, primarily Belgium, France, Holland and Czechoslovakia. According to Hitler at a speech in the Reichstag on April 29, 1939, having occupied Czechoslovakia, Germany received 1582 aircraft, 469 tanks, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 2175 guns of various calibers, 115 thousand rifles, 3 million artillery shells, 43 thousand machine guns, a billion infantry ammunition and other military materials: engineering, fastening, measuring devices, many cars, spotlights and other things. On November 7, on the day of an important public holiday, a parade took place on Red Square. Soldiers in winter uniforms and tanks, as well as other equipment, were buried in the snow. The units went from the parade straight to their combat positions.

November 17 was an important milestone in the battle for Moscow. Then Hitler’s favorite General Guderian received information that soldiers from Siberia had appeared at the Uzlovaya station, and that transport trains were bringing in new Soviet reinforcements along the Ryazan-Kolomna branch. According to other information, the German 112th Division retreated, and the number of soldiers with frostbite, unable to fight, was growing. The soldiers of this division were seized by panic, which spread along part of the front right up to Bogoroditsk. Mass desertion became a big warning for the German troops and their command. This was a clear signal that the German infantry was exhausted. However, the German command still did not take these signals seriously. After all, on the approaches to Moscow, the Germans still occupied a dangerous position. On November 28, they took the bridge near Yakhroma and made their way to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga canal. Long and incredibly brutal battles broke out for the key city - Tula. At the end of November, some German generals already understood the seriousness of the situation in which their forces found themselves in front of Moscow and in other parts of the front. Characteristic, for example, are the words of General Halder: “Field Marshal von Bock personally leads the battle of Moscow from his mobile command post. His energy propels the troops forward by all means... The troops have almost exhausted their strength. Von Bock compares this battle with the Battle of the Marne." First of all, the lack of winter equipment, according to the Germans, played a tragic role. Von Bock also asked to send the 12th division from the reserve, since there were no longer enough forces to encircle Moscow.

The last German offensive began on the second of December. Some German commanders firmly believed in success and the capture of Moscow. The fighting then took place in a situation where there was a lot of snow everywhere and there were severe frosts. By noon that day, several German units reached the Moscow suburb of Khimki, near the Sheremetyevo airfield that later appeared. But they never managed to advance further. So only German prisoners of war were able to see the Kremlin with their own eyes. On the fourth of December, General Guderian's units again approached Tula and began to make their way to the Moscow River, but in the end, due to a lack of ammunition, they had to retreat with heavy losses. This was the very last German offensive near Moscow. A noticeable retreat soon followed on almost all sectors of the front near Moscow. All this was accompanied by further major losses, including in equipment that the Nazis did not have time to take out during the retreat. On the night of December 5-6, Guderian, on his own responsibility, led his units into retreat. He justifies his decision by extremely unfavorable climatic conditions and the exhaustion of the offensive capabilities of neighboring units. At the same time, for the same reasons, two armored units located 35 kilometers north of Moscow are abandoning the planned offensive.

The heavy defeat of the Nazis near Moscow was the beginning of their disaster on the Eastern Front

On December 5, the offensive of the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front, the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front began. In a counteroffensive that was unexpected for the Germans, the Soviet command managed to involve more than a million soldiers, more than a thousand aircraft, more than 800 tanks and more than 7,500 guns. Just recently, very self-confident German troops were forced to rapidly retreat from Moscow, Tikhvin and Taganrog. German forces were retreating along almost the entire length of the front. A parallel is often drawn with 1812 and the rapid retreat of Napoleon’s troops from Moscow and Russia in general. By December 20, the Nazis were forced to leave Klin, Kalinin and the Tula region. “Our attack on Moscow failed. We suffered a heavy defeat, the consequences of which, as it became clear in the following weeks, were fatal, and the obstinacy of the high command in distant East Prussia was to blame,” General Guderian later said. After this failure, Hitler himself took charge of military operations and changed command almost everywhere. Later, General Halder admitted that the defeat near Moscow was a disaster and, in fact, the beginning of a great tragedy in the east. In December 1941, General von Bock wrote the following in his diary: “Now I have no doubt that the military operation near Moscow, in which I probably played the most important role, failed and marked a turning point in the war in general.” German military historian Reinhard wrote: "Hitler's plans, and with them the prospect of winning the war, failed in October 1941, especially after the launch of the Russian counter-offensive near Moscow in December 1941." Ludwik Svoboda, who was in the USSR at that time and was preparing conditions there for training our soldiers, wrote in his personal diary: “The offensive of the Red Army along the entire front was very successful. It seems that the German army is facing disaster near Moscow. Its defeat depends on how strong Hitler's government is in the Reich. From the German army, undoubtedly, only remnants will return home.”

The offensive of the Soviet army continued successfully in December 1941 and January 1942, and during it many cities and villages were liberated. For example, Volokolamsk was liberated on December 20, Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4. Rzhev was recaptured on January 7, 1942. In January 1942, Soviet forces were almost equal to the 183 divisions of the Germans and their satellites, but the Soviet army had an advantage in the number of tanks and aircraft. In the period from December 6 to January 10 alone, the losses of Hitler’s troops amounted to more than 300 thousand killed and wounded. The German troops faced serious difficulties that were not easy to disguise, because by the first of January 1942 they were short of about 340 thousand people. During the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Red Army recaptured more than 11,000 towns and villages northwest of the capital and advanced 400 kilometers in some areas. Territories the size of the former Czechoslovakia, with a population of approximately five million people, were liberated. The first significant turning point occurred in the war. Goebbels, who appealed to the population to donate winter clothing and skis to the Wehrmacht, was forced to admit that “millions of our soldiers, after a year of fierce fighting, stand face to face with an enemy who has a great numerical and material advantage.” Some parts of the uniform made from surrogate raw materials did not protect against the harsh Russian winter. The British fleet, which held a blockade of Germany for two years, undoubtedly made its contribution here, so the Germans did not have enough wool to sew high-quality clothes for the soldiers.

The Nazis retreating from Moscow left behind a huge desert. They did not disdain the barbaric seizure of valuables. Before retreating to Klin, they plundered Tchaikovsky’s house, in which they burned furniture and books of the famous composer. In Istra they burned the New Jerusalem Monastery. In Yasnaya Polyana, in Tolstoy's house, where Guderian's main headquarters was located, the museum was looted, and many objects were destroyed and burned.

After the start of a large-scale German offensive on Moscow in early October 1941, over the next two months the fate of the USSR capital hung in the balance. There were days when the Germans declared that their victory was very close, and that on the battlefield they were the masters of the situation. The whole world could more than once hear proclamations that the domes of the Kremlin can already be seen with good field binoculars. At certain moments, the Kremlin indeed seemed very close to the fascist invaders, but even then it was and will forever remain inaccessible to them. In mid-December 1941, the whole world learned about the German defeat near Moscow. This defeat lifted the spirits in our country. In the illegal newspaper Krasnoe Pravo, edited by Julius Fuček, the Christmas wish then was:

“Everyone will be delighted to receive a generous gift of peace and freedom under the Christmas tree on the Generous Evening, and Hitler on the Christmas tree.”

How did Czech television celebrate the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War this year or the current anniversary of the Battle of Moscow? It did not disappoint this time either: from the fourth of September we are shown a 44-episode documentary film entitled “Heydrich. Last decision." I am confident that we have every right to demand that other important anniversaries related to the events of the Second World War receive adequate television time. The anniversary of the Battle of Moscow undoubtedly applies to them. But instead we continue to watch repeats of programs about the Wehrmacht or the “important” people of the Third Reich. True, this has long been very typical for Czech television.

The meaning of the word "blitzkrieg" (Blitzkrieg - "lightning", Krieg - "war") is known to many. This is a military strategy. It involves a lightning-fast attack on the enemy using a large amount of military equipment. It is assumed that the enemy will not have time to deploy his main forces and will be successfully defeated. This is exactly the tactic the Germans used when they attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. We will talk about this military operation in our article.

Background

The theory of lightning war arose in the early 20th century. It was invented by the German military leader Alfred von Schlieffen. The tactics were very clever. The world was experiencing an unprecedented technological boom, and the military had new combat weapons at its disposal. But during the First World War the blitzkrieg failed. The imperfection of military equipment and weak aviation had an impact. Germany's rapid offensive against France faltered. The successful use of this method of military action was postponed until better times. And they came in 1940, when Nazi Germany carried out a lightning occupation, first in Poland and then in France.

"Barborossa"

In 1941, it was the USSR's turn. Hitler rushed to the East with a very specific goal. He needed to neutralize the Soviet Union in order to strengthen his dominance in Europe. England continued to resist, counting on the support of the Red Army. This obstacle had to be eliminated.

The Barbarossa plan was developed to attack the USSR. It was based on the theory of blitzkrieg. It was a very ambitious project. The German fighting machine was about to unleash all its might on the Soviet Union. It was considered possible to destroy the main forces of the Russian troops through the operational invasion of tank divisions. Four combat groups were created, combining tank, motorized and infantry divisions. They had to first penetrate far behind enemy lines, and then unite with each other. The ultimate goal of the new lightning war was to seize the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Before the attack, Hitler's strategists were confident that the war with the Soviet Union would take them only three to four months.

Strategy

German troops were divided into three large groups: "North", "Center" and "South". "North" was advancing on Leningrad. "Center" was rushing towards Moscow. "South" was supposed to conquer Kyiv and Donbass. The main role in the attack was given to tank groups. There were four of them, led by Guderian, Hoth, Gopner and Kleist. It was they who were supposed to carry out the fleeting blitzkrieg. It wasn't that impossible. However, the German generals miscalculated.

Start

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. German bombers were the first to cross the border of the Soviet Union. They bombed Russian cities and military airfields. It was a smart move. The destruction of Soviet aviation gave the invaders a serious advantage. The damage was particularly severe in Belarus. In the first hours of the war, 700 aircraft were destroyed.

Then German ground divisions entered the lightning war. And if the army group “North” managed to successfully cross the Neman and approach Vilnius, then the “Center” met unexpected resistance in Brest. Of course, this did not stop Hitler’s elite units. However, it made an impression on the German soldiers. For the first time they realized who they had to deal with. The Russians died, but did not give up.

Tank battles

The German Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union failed. But Hitler had a huge chance of success. In 1941, the Germans had the most advanced military technology in the world. Therefore, the very first tank battle between the Russians and the Nazis turned into a beating. The fact is that Soviet combat vehicles of the 1932 model were defenseless against enemy guns. They did not meet modern requirements. More than 300 T-26 and BT-7 light tanks were destroyed in the first days of the war. However, in some places the Nazis encountered serious resistance. The big shock for them was the meeting with the brand new T-34 and KV-1. German shells flew off the tanks, which seemed like unprecedented monsters to the invaders. But the general situation at the front was still catastrophic. The Soviet Union did not have time to deploy its main forces. The Red Army suffered huge losses.

Chronicle of events

Period from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942. Historians call it the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. At this time, the initiative belonged entirely to the invaders. In a relatively short period of time, the Nazis occupied Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Belarus and Moldova. Then enemy divisions began the siege of Leningrad and captured Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don. However, the main goal of the Nazis was Moscow. This would allow the Soviet Union to be struck at the very heart. However, the lightning offensive quickly fell behind the approved schedule. On September 8, 1941, the military blockade of Leningrad began. The Wehrmacht troops stood under it for 872 days, but were never able to conquer the city. The Kyiv Cauldron is considered the largest defeat of the Red Army. More than 600,000 people died there. The Germans captured a huge amount of military equipment, opened their way to the Azov region and Donbass, but... lost precious time. It was not for nothing that the commander of the 2nd Panzer Division, Guderian, left the front line, came to Hitler’s headquarters and tried to convince him that Germany’s main task at the moment was the occupation of Moscow. Blitzkrieg is a powerful breakthrough into the interior of the country, which turns into complete defeat for the enemy. However, Hitler did not listen to anyone. He preferred to send military units of the “Center” to the South to seize territories where valuable natural resources were concentrated.

Blitzkrieg failure

This is a turning point in the history of Nazi Germany. Now the Nazis had no chance. They say that Field Marshal Keitel, when asked when he first realized that the blitzkrieg had failed, answered only one word: “Moscow.” The defense of the capital turned the tide of the Second World War. On December 6, 1941, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. After this, the "lightning" war turned into a battle of attrition. How could enemy strategists make such a miscalculation? Among the reasons, some historians name total Russian impassability and severe frost. However, the invaders themselves pointed to two main reasons:

• fierce enemy resistance;
• biased assessment of the defense capability of the Red Army.

Of course, the fact that Russian soldiers defended their Motherland also played a role. And they managed to defend every inch of their native land. The failure of Nazi Germany's blitzkrieg against the USSR is a great feat that evokes sincere admiration. And this feat was accomplished by soldiers of the multinational Red Army.