The results of Stolypin's peasant reform. Agrarian reform P.A

in pre-revolutionary historiography exaggeration of successes by supporters of the farming path of development (A.A. Kofod, B. Yuryevsky) and criticism by supporters of peasant communal farming (A.V. Peshekhonov, N.P. Oganovsky). V.I. Lenin characterized the reform as an attempt (the “last valve”) to create conditions for the final victory of the Prussian (landlord) type of capitalism. The results of the reform are assessed as collapse.

in Soviet historiography 1920-50s the period of agrarian reform was considered as the final stage of the victory of capitalism in agriculture. The main goal of the reform was the creation of a social support in the person of the kulaks, and the destruction of the community as an auxiliary preliminary task (S.M. Dubrovsky, P.I. Lyashchenko, A.V. Shestakov).

At the end of the 50-60s. A number of discussions took place about the characteristics of growth. imperialism, the level of development of agrarian capitalism. The problem of the level of development of agrarian capitalism and its maturity as a result of agrarian reform is posed in the works of A. M. Anfimov. In his opinion, semi-serf relations remained in agriculture by 1917. In the 1970-80s. a number of works on the topic were written by A.Ya. Avrehom. Stolypin continued to be viewed as a reactionary representative of the Russian nobility, and the agrarian reform, as a manifestation of the policy of Bonopartism, was aimed at splitting the peasants. A special point of view was expressed by V.S. Dyakin: objectively, the reform affected local land ownership and in the future the landowners were expected to lose political and economic positions. He considered the primary task of the reform to be the destruction of the community and the creation of a class of small landowners.

The book by P. N. Zyryanov is the latest achievement in Soviet historiography on this issue. He noted that during the reform there was a change in goals: initially, the destruction of the community was one of the two main goals of the reform, the second goal was the creation of a layer of small owners with a sustainable economy. Later, however, this last goal changed and “the small owner was replaced by a mass owner, whose economy was obviously not strong and needed significant financial support.” Zyryanov also concluded that “the actual course of the reform corresponded very little to Stolypin’s original plans. “The community is by no means did not collapse, it was only somewhat relieved of excess labor and freed from those of its members who had ceased to be peasants.” The matter of “creating a layer of “strong masters” loyal to the government was going slowly.”

In general, according to Zyryanov, the reform failed because firstly, it was not possible to create any broad layer of small owners, secondly, it was not possible to significantly shake the community; it continued to exist, uniting peasants who still preferred to act as a whole “in peace”, finally, thirdly, it was clearly not The relocation project was a success.

The results of the reform were characterized by rapid growth in agricultural production, an increase in the capacity of the domestic market, an increase in the export of agricultural products, and Russia's trade balance became increasingly active. As a result, it was possible not only to bring agriculture out of the crisis, but also to turn it into a dominant feature of Russia’s economic development.

The gross income of all agriculture in 1913 amounted to 52.6% of the total GDP. The income of the entire national economy, due to the increase in the value of products created in agriculture, increased in comparable prices from 1900 to 1913 by 33.8%.

Differentiation of types of agricultural production by region led to an increase in the marketability of agriculture. Three quarters of all raw materials processed by the industry came from agriculture. The turnover of agricultural products increased by 46% during the reform period.

Exports of agricultural products increased even more, by 61% compared to 1901-1905, in the pre-war years. Russia was the largest producer and exporter of bread and flax, and a number of livestock products. Thus, in 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 36.4% of total world exports.

The above does not mean at all that pre-war Russia should be represented as a “peasant paradise.” The problems of hunger and agricultural overpopulation were not resolved. The country still suffered from technical, economic and cultural backwardness. According to calculations by I.D. Kondratiev in the USA, on average, a farm had a fixed capital of 3,900 rubles, and in European Russia the fixed capital of an average peasant farm barely reached 900 rubles. The national income per capita of the agricultural population in Russia was approximately 52 rubles per year, and in the United States - 262 rubles.

The rate of growth in labor productivity in agriculture has been comparatively slow. While in Russia in 1913 they received 55 pounds of bread per dessiatine, in the USA they received 68, in France - 89, and in Belgium - 168 pounds. Economic growth occurred not on the basis of intensification of production, but due to an increase in the intensity of manual peasant labor. But during the period under review, socio-economic conditions were created for the transition to a new stage of agrarian transformation - the transformation of agriculture into a capital-intensive, technologically advanced sector of the economy.

But a number of external circumstances (the death of Stolypin, the beginning of the war) interrupted the Stolypin reform. Stolypin himself believed that it would take 15-20 years for his endeavors to succeed. But during the period 1906 - 1913, a lot was done.

The results of the Stolypin agrarian reform are expressed in the following figures. By January 1, 1916, 2 million householders had left the community for the interstitial fortification. They owned 14.1 million acres of land. 499 thousand householders living in allotment-free communities received certificates of identification for 2.8 million dessiatines. 1.3 million householders switched to farm and cut ownership (12.7 million dessiatines). In addition, as already mentioned, 280 thousand farms and farms were formed on bank lands - this is a special account. 22% of land was withdrawn from communal circulation. About half of them went on sale. Some part returned to the community pot. Ultimately, the authorities failed to either destroy the community or create a stable and sufficiently massive layer of peasant-owners. So we can talk about the general failure of the Stolypin agrarian reform.

At the same time, it is known that after the end of the revolution and before the outbreak of the First World War, the situation in the Russian village improved noticeably. Some journalists frivolously connect this with the implementation of agrarian reform. In fact, other factors were at work. Firstly, as already mentioned, since 1907, redemption payments, which peasants had been paying for more than 40 years, were abolished. Secondly, the global agricultural crisis ended and grain prices began to rise. From this, one must assume, something also fell to ordinary peasants. Thirdly, during the years of the revolution, landownership decreased, and in connection with this, bonded forms of exploitation decreased. Finally, fourthly, during the entire period there was only one lean year (1911), but there were excellent harvests for two years in a row (1912-1913). As for agrarian reform, such a large-scale event, which required such a significant land shake-up, could not have a positive impact in the very first years of its implementation.

The positive results of the reform include the fact that a whole class appeared, it can be called “middle” by modern standards, peasants could sell and buy land, which was now their personal property. If we compare the situation at the beginning of the 20th century and its end, it is unlikely that we will be able to note any positive changes in agriculture. However, recalling the words of Prince M. Andronnikov, we note that the effectiveness of the reform was very small: per farm there were many dispossessed peasants who lost their land due to some reason, usually it was drunkenness, i.e. householders drank their plots of land, of course all these people replenished the army of proletarians, which was already quite large, but this is unlikely to be any fault of Stolypin, I note that Stolypin was never able to update the cabinet of ministers as he wanted, the main obstacle was the huge bureaucratic machine built in our country, which did everything as it was convenient for it.

Some of Stolypin's plans were realized only after his death; Thus, only in 1912 were laws passed on primary schools and workers' insurance. Stolypin's insistence on approving bills often led to conflicts with the State Council, and in 1911 it led to a government crisis.

Stolypin's reform yielded results a few years later, around 1912-1913. We can observe the advantage of individual farming in the example of collective farms, which were created by the Soviet government as a kind of community. Thus, we have come to the need for a “repeat” Stolypin reform in new economic and political conditions. It is worth noting that such a reform is already proceeding very slowly, and it is a pity that at the end of the 20th century we found ourselves in such a situation.

Results of the Stolypin agrarian reform
Positive	Negative
Up to a quarter of the farms were separated from the community, the stratification of the village increased, the rural elite provided up to half of the market grain	From 70 to 90% of peasants who left the community retained ties with it; the bulk were labor farms of community members
3 million households moved from European Russia	0.5 million displaced people returned to Central Russia
4 million acres of communal land were involved in market circulation	There were 2-4 dessiatines per peasant yard, while the norm was 7-8 dessiatines
The cost of agricultural implements increased from 59 to 83 rubles per yard	The main agricultural implement is the plow (8 million pieces), 52% of farms did not have plows
Consumption of superphosphate fertilizers increased from 8 to 20 million poods	Mineral fertilizers were used on 2% of the sown area
For 1890-1913 per capita income of the rural population increased from 22 to 33 rubles per year	In 1911-1912 the country was struck by famine, affecting 30 million people

Stolypin's reforms are an unsuccessful attempt by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, Pyotr Alekseevich Stolypin (who held the position from 1906 to 1911), which met resistance from Russian society, to create conditions in Russia for its more powerful economic growth while maintaining autocracy and the existing political and social order

Stolypin (1862-1911)

Russian statesman, served as governor of the Saratov and Grodno provinces, minister of internal affairs, and prime minister.

“He was tall, and there was something majestic in his posture: imposing, impeccably dressed, but without any panache, he spoke loudly enough, without tension. His speech somehow floated above the audience. It seemed that, penetrating through the walls, it sounded somewhere in a large expanse. He spoke for Russia. This was very suitable for a person who, if he did not “sit on the royal throne,” then under certain circumstances would be worthy of taking it. In a word, in his manner and appearance one could see an all-Russian dictator. However, he was a dictator of the type who was not prone to rude attacks. (Having headed the government), Stolypin put forward as a government action program the fight against revolutionary violence, on the one hand, and the fight against inertia, on the other. Rebuff the revolution, patronage of evolution - such was his slogan" (V. Shulgin "The Years")

Reasons for Stolypin's reforms

- exposed a lot of problems preventing Russia from becoming a powerful capitalist country
- The revolution created anarchy that had to be fought
- The ruling class of Russia had too different understandings of the ways of development of the state

Problems of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century

• Antediluvian agrarian relations
• Dissatisfaction with the situation of workers
• Illiteracy, lack of education of the people
• Weakness, indecisiveness of power
• National question
• The existence of aggressive, extremist organizations

The goal of Stolypin's reforms was to transform Russia in an evolutionary way into a modern, developed, strong, capitalist power.

Stolypin's reforms. Briefly

- Agrarian reform
- Justice reform
- Reform of local government in the Western provinces

The judicial reform was expressed in the establishment of military courts. Stolypin took over Russia during a period of unrest. The state, which was guided by the previous legislation, could not cope with the onslaught of murders, robberies, banditry, robberies, and terrorist attacks. The “Regulations of the Council of Ministers on Courts Martial” made it possible to carry out proceedings regarding violations of laws in an expedited manner. The trial was held without the participation of a prosecutor, a lawyer, and without defense witnesses, behind closed doors. The sentence had to be pronounced no later than 48 hours and carried out within 24 hours. Military courts handed down 1,102 death sentences, and 683 people were executed.

Contemporaries noticed that people whose portraits were created by Repin, and he was considered a popular portrait painter, immediately left this world. He painted Mussorgsky - he died, Pirogov - followed the example of Mussorgsky, Pisemsky and pianist Mercy de Argento died, just about to portray Tyutchev, he fell ill and soon died. “Ilya Efimovich! - the writer Oldor once addressed the artist as a joke - write, please, Stolypin" (from the memoirs of K. Chukovsky)
The reform of local self-government in the Vitebsk, Volyn, Kyiv, Minsk, Mogilev and Podolsk provinces consisted of dividing electoral congresses and assemblies into two national branches, Polish and non-Polish, so that the non-Polish branch would elect a larger number of zemstvo councilors.

The reform drew criticism not only from State Duma deputies, but also from government ministers. Only the emperor supported Stolypin. “Stolypin was unrecognizable. Something broke in him, his former self-confidence was gone somewhere. He himself, apparently, felt that everyone around him, silently or openly, was hostile” (V.N. Kokovtsov “From My Past”)

Agrarian reform

Target

• Overcoming patriarchal relations in the Russian village that hinder the development of capitalism
• Elimination of social tension in the agricultural sector of the economy
• Increasing the productivity of peasant labor

Methods

• Granting the right to a peasant to leave the peasant community and assigning him a plot of land in private ownership

The peasant community consisted of peasants who previously belonged to the same landowner and lived in the same village. All peasant allotment land was owned by the community, which regularly redistributed land among peasant households depending on the size of families. Meadow, pasture lands and forests were not divided between peasants and were jointly owned by the community. The community could at any time change the size of the plots of peasant families in accordance with the changed number of workers and ability to pay taxes. The state dealt only with communities and the amount of taxes and fees collected from the lands was also calculated for the community as a whole. All members of the community were bound by mutual responsibility. That is, the community was collectively responsible for the payment of all types of taxes by all its members.

• Granting the right to the peasant to sell and mortgage his plots and pass them on by inheritance
• Granting peasants the right to create separate (outside the village) farms (farms)
• Issuance by the Peasant Bank of a loan to peasants secured by land for a period of 55.5 years for the purchase of land from a landowner
• Preferential loans to peasants secured by land
• Resettlement of land-poor peasants to state-owned lands in sparsely populated areas of the Urals and Siberia
• State support for agronomic activities aimed at improving labor and increasing productivity

Results

• 21% of peasants left the community
• 10% of peasants made an attempt to establish themselves as farms
• 60% of migrants to Siberia and the Urals quickly returned to their villages
• In addition to the contradictions between peasants and landowners, there were added contradictions between those who left and those who remained in the community
• The process of class stratification of the peasantry accelerated
• Increase in number caused by peasants leaving the community
• Growth in the number of kulaks (rural entrepreneurs, bourgeoisie)
• Growth of agricultural production due to the expansion of sown areas and the use of technology

Only today are Stolypin’s actions called correct. During his lifetime and during the Soviet regime, agrarian reform was criticized, although it was not completed. After all, the reformer himself believed that the outcome of the reform should be summed up no earlier than after “twenty years of internal and external peace.”

Stolypin's reforms in dates

• 1906, July 8 - Stolypin became prime minister
• 1906, August 12 - assassination attempt on Stolypin, organized by the Socialist Revolutionaries. He was not injured, but 27 people died, two of Stolypin’s children were wounded
• 1906, August 19 - establishment of military courts
• 1906, August - transfer of appanage and part of state lands to the jurisdiction of the Peasant Bank for sale to peasants
• 1906, October 5 - decree granting peasants the same rights as other classes in relation to public service, freedom to choose their place of residence
• 1906, October 14 and 15 - decrees expanding the activities of the Peasant Land Bank and facilitating the conditions for the purchase of land by peasants on credit
• 1906, November 9 - decree allowing peasants to leave the community
• 1907, December - acceleration of the process of resettlement of peasants to Siberia and the Urals, encouraged by the state
• 1907, May 10 - Stolypin delivered a speech to the Duma deputies containing a detailed program of reforms

“The main idea of ​​this document was as follows. There are periods when the state lives a more or less peaceful life. And then the introduction of new laws, caused by new needs, into the thickness of the previous century-old legislation is quite painless. But there are periods of a different nature when, for one reason or another, social thought comes into ferment. At this time, new laws may contradict the old ones and great effort is required so that, while rapidly moving forward, not to turn public life into a kind of chaos, anarchy. It was precisely such a period, according to Stolypin, that Russia was going through. To cope with this difficult task, the government needed to restrain with one hand the anarchic principles that threatened to wash away all the historical foundations of the state, and with the other, to hastily build the scaffolding necessary for the construction of new buildings dictated by urgent needs. In other words, Stolypin put forward as a government action program the fight against revolutionary violence, on the one hand, and the fight against inertia, on the other. Rebuff the revolution, patronize evolution - such was his slogan. Without going deeper this time into the complex of measures to combat the revolution, that is, without threatening anyone for the time being, Stolypin set about outlining the reforms proposed by the government in an evolutionary direction” (V. Shulgin “The Years”)

• 1908, April 10 - law on compulsory primary education with a phased introduction over 10 years
• 1909, May 31 - The Duma adopted a law to strengthen the Russification of Finland
• 1909, October - Russia took first place in the world in grain production and exports
• 1910, June 14 - The Duma adopted a law expanding the possibilities for peasants to leave the community
• 1911, January - student unrest, university autonomy limited
• 1911, March 14 - introduction of zemstvos in the western provinces
• 1911, May 29 - a new law making it even easier for peasants to leave the community
• 1911, September 11 - death of Stolypin at the hands of a terrorist

“Only during the intermission I got out of my seat and approached the barrier... Suddenly there was a sharp crack. The orchestra members jumped up from their seats. The crash was repeated. I didn't realize it was shots. The high school student standing next to me shouted:
- Look! He sat down right on the floor!
- Who?
- Stolypin. Out! Near the barrier in the orchestra!
I looked there. It was unusually quiet in the theater. A tall man with a black round beard and a ribbon over his shoulder was sitting on the floor near the barrier. He fumbled along the barrier with his hands, as if he wanted to grab it and stand up.
It was empty around Stolypin. A young man in a tailcoat walked down the aisle from Stolypin to the exit doors. I couldn't see his face at that distance. I just noticed that he walked very calmly, in no hurry. Someone screamed in a long voice. There was a crash. An officer jumped down from the benoir box and grabbed the young man by the hand. Immediately a crowd gathered around them.
- Clear the gallery! - said the gendarmerie officer behind me.
We were quickly driven into the corridor. The doors to the auditorium were closed. We stood there, not understanding anything. A dull noise came from the auditorium. Then it died down and the orchestra began playing “God Save the Tsar.”
“He killed Stolypin,” Fitsovsky told me in a whisper.
- Don't talk! Leave the theater immediately! - shouted the gendarmerie officer.
We took the same dark stairs to the square, brightly lit by lanterns. The square was empty. Chains of mounted policemen pushed the crowds standing near the theater into side streets and continued to push them further and further. The horses, backing away, nervously moved their legs. The sound of horseshoes could be heard throughout the entire area. The horn sounded. An ambulance drove up to the theater at a sweeping trot. The orderlies jumped out with a stretcher and ran into the theater. We left the square slowly. We wanted to see what would happen next. The policemen hurried us, but they looked so confused that we did not listen to them. We saw how Stolypin was carried out on a stretcher. They were pushed into the carriage, and it rushed along Vladimirskaya Street. Mounted gendarmes galloped along the sides of the carriage. (The terrorist’s) name was Bagrov. At the trial, Bagrov behaved lazily and calmly. When the verdict was read to him, he said: “I don’t care at all whether I eat another two thousand cutlets in my life or not” (Paustovsky “Distant Years”)

P.A. Stolypin(1862-1911). In 1906-1911 Stolypin is Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs. Operating principles: calm and reforms, - “Give the state 20 years of internal and external peace, and you will not recognize today’s Russia,” “You need great upheavals, but we need a great Russia.” I bet on the lower classes. Neither the government nor the court understood Stolypin. In 1911, he was killed at a performance in the Kyiv opera, where the sovereign was (the killer was Bagrov: the son of a lawyer, landowner; he was associated with the Social Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, anarcho-communists, but worked for the secret police; he was hanged).

Reform of 1861- the first stage of the transition to individualization of land ownership and land use. But the abolition of serfdom did not lead to the progress of private property. In the 80-90s, the government sought to establish communal structures in the countryside, which contradicted, in the future, free peasant property. The reforms started by P.A. Stolypin could overcome these difficulties. His concept proposed a path for the development of a mixed, multi-structure economy, where state forms of economy had to compete with collective and private ones.

Components of his program- transition to farms, the use of cooperation, the development of land reclamation, the introduction of three-stage agricultural education, the organization of cheap credit for peasants, the formation of an agricultural party that would actually represent the interests of the small landowner.

Stolypin puts forward a liberal doctrine of managing rural communities, developing private property in rural areas and achieving, on this basis, economic growth. With the progress of the market-oriented peasant economy, in the course of the development of land purchase and sale relations, there should have been a natural reduction in the landowners' land fund. The future agrarian system of Russia was presented to the prime minister in the form of a system of small and medium-sized farms, united by local self-governing and small-sized noble estates. On this basis, the integration of two cultures - noble and peasant - was supposed to take place.

Stolypin bets on "strong and strong" peasants. However, it does not require widespread uniformity or unification of forms of land ownership and land use. Where, due to local conditions, the community is economically viable, “it is necessary for the peasant himself to choose the method of using the land that suits him best.”

Agrarian reform consisted of a set of sequentially carried out and interconnected measures.

Peasant Bank.

The Bank carried out large-scale purchases of lands with their subsequent resale to peasants on preferential terms, and intermediary operations to increase peasant land use. He increased credit to the peasants and significantly reduced the cost of it, and the bank paid more interest on its obligations than the peasants paid it. The difference in payment was covered by subsidies from the budget.

The Bank actively influenced the forms of land ownership: for peasants who acquired land as their sole property, payments were reduced. As a result, if before 1906 the bulk of land buyers were peasant collectives, then by 1913 79.7% of buyers were individual peasants.

Destruction of the community and development of private property.

To transition to new economic relations, a whole system of economic and legal measures was developed to regulate the agricultural economy. The decree of November 9, 1906 proclaimed the predominance of the fact of sole ownership of land over the legal right of use. Peasants could now allocate land that was actually in use from the community, regardless of its will.

Measures were taken to ensure the strength and stability of working peasant farms. Thus, in order to avoid land speculation and concentration of property, the maximum size of individual land ownership was legally limited, and the sale of land to non-peasants was allowed.

The law of June 5, 1912 allowed the issuance of a loan secured by any allotment land acquired by peasants. The development of various forms of credit: mortgage, reclamation, agricultural, land management - contributed to the intensification of market relations in the countryside.

In 1907 - 1915 25% of householders declared separation from the community, but 20% actually separated - 2008.4 thousand householders. New forms of land tenure became widespread: farms and cuts. On January 1, 1916, there were already 1,221.5 thousand of them. In addition, the law of June 14, 1910 considered it unnecessary for many peasants who were only formally considered community members to leave the community. The number of such farms amounted to about one third of all communal households.

Relocation of peasants to Siberia.

By decree of March 10, 1906, the right to resettle peasants was granted to everyone without restrictions. The government allocated considerable funds for the costs of settling settlers in new places, for their medical care and public needs, and for building roads. In 1906-1913, 2792.8 thousand people moved beyond the Urals. The scale of this event also led to difficulties in its implementation. The number of peasants who were unable to adapt to new conditions and were forced to return amounted to 12% of the total number of migrants.

The results of the resettlement campaign were as follows. Firstly, during this period there was a huge leap in the economic and social development of Siberia. The population of this region increased by 153% during the years of colonization. If before the resettlement to Siberia there was a reduction in sown areas, then in 1906-1913 they were expanded by 80%, while in the European part of Russia by 6.2%. In terms of the pace of development of livestock farming, Siberia was also ahead of the European part of Russia.

Cooperative movement.

Loans from the peasant bank could not fully satisfy the peasant's demand for money goods. Therefore, credit cooperation has become widespread and has gone through two stages in its development. At the first stage, administrative forms of regulation of small credit relations prevailed. By creating a qualified cadre of small loan inspectors, and by allocating significant credit through state banks for initial loans to credit unions and for subsequent loans, the government stimulated the cooperative movement. At the second stage, rural credit partnerships, accumulating their own capital, developed independently.

As a result, a wide network of small peasant credit institutions, savings and loan banks and credit partnerships was created that served the cash flow of peasant farms. By January 1, 1914, the number of such institutions exceeded 13 thousand.

Credit relations gave a strong impetus to the development of production, consumer and marketing cooperatives. Peasants on a cooperative basis created artels, agricultural societies, consumer shops, etc.

Agricultural activities.

One of the main obstacles to the economic progress of the village was the low level of farming and illiteracy of the vast majority of producers, accustomed to working according to the general custom. During the years of reform, peasants were provided with large-scale agro-economic assistance. Agro-industrial services were specially created for peasants, who organized training courses on cattle breeding and dairy production, democratization and the introduction of progressive forms of agricultural production. Much attention was paid to the progress of the system of out-of-school agricultural education. If in 1905 the number of students at agricultural courses was 2 thousand people, then in 1912 - 58 thousand, and at agricultural readings - 31.6 thousand and 1046 thousand people, respectively.

Results of reforms.

The results of the reform were characterized by rapid growth in agricultural production, an increase in the capacity of the domestic market, an increase in the export of agricultural products, and Russia's trade balance became increasingly active. As a result, it was possible not only to bring agriculture out of the crisis, but also to turn it into a dominant feature of Russia’s economic development.

The gross income of all agriculture in 1913 amounted to 52.6% of the total GDP. The income of the entire national economy, due to the increase in the value of products created in agriculture, increased in comparable prices from 1900 to 1913 by 33.8%.

Differentiation of types of agricultural production by region led to an increase in the marketability of agriculture. Three quarters of all raw materials processed by the industry came from agriculture. The turnover of agricultural products increased by 46% during the reform period.

Exports of agricultural products increased even more, by 61% compared to 1901-1905, in the pre-war years. Russia was the largest producer and exporter of bread and flax, and a number of livestock products. Thus, in 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 36.4% of total world exports.

This does not mean at all that pre-war Russia should be represented as a “peasant paradise.” The problems of hunger and agricultural overpopulation were not resolved. The country still suffered from technical, economic and cultural backwardness. According to calculations by I.D. Kondratiev in the USA, on average, a farm had a fixed capital of 3,900 rubles, and in European Russia the fixed capital of an average peasant farm barely reached 900 rubles. The national income per capita of the agricultural population in Russia was approximately 52 rubles per year, and in the United States - 262 rubles.

The rate of growth in labor productivity in agriculture has been comparatively slow. While in Russia in 1913 they received 55 poods of bread per dessiatine, in the USA they received 68, in France - 89, and in Belgium - 168 poods. Economic growth occurred not on the basis of intensification of production, but due to an increase in the intensity of manual peasant labor. But during the period under review, socio-economic conditions were created for the transition to a new stage of agrarian transformation - the transformation of agriculture into a capital-intensive, technologically advanced sector of the economy.

But a number of external circumstances (the death of Stolypin, the beginning of the war) interrupted the Stolypin reform. Stolypin himself believed that it would take 15-20 years for his endeavors to succeed. But during the period 1906 - 1913, a lot was done.

agrarian reform land tenure Stolypin

The results of the reform are characterized by rapid growth in agricultural production, an increase in the capacity of the domestic market, an increase in the export of agricultural products, and Russia's trade balance has become increasingly active. As a result, it was possible not only to bring agriculture out of the crisis, but also to turn it into a dominant feature of Russia’s economic development. The gross income of all agriculture in 1913 amounted to 52.6% of the total gross income. The income of the entire national economy, due to the increase in value created in agriculture, increased in comparable prices from 1900 to 1913 by 33.8%.

Differentiation of types of agricultural production by region led to an increase in the marketability of agriculture. Three quarters of all raw materials processed by the industry came from agriculture. The turnover of agricultural products increased by 46% during the reform period.

Exports of agricultural products increased even more, by 61% compared to 1901-1905, in the pre-war years. Russia was the largest producer and exporter of bread and flax, and a number of livestock products. Thus, in 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 36.4% of total world exports.

The above does not mean at all that pre-war Russia should be represented as a “peasant paradise.” The problems of hunger and agricultural overpopulation were not resolved. The country still suffered from technical, economic and cultural backwardness. According to calculations by I.D. Kondratiev in the USA, on average, a farm had a fixed capital of 3,900 rubles, and in European Russia, the fixed capital of an average peasant farm barely reached 900 rubles. The national income per capita of the agricultural population in Russia was approximately 52 rubles per year, and in the United States - 262 rubles.

The rate of growth in labor productivity in agriculture has been comparatively slow. While in Russia in 1913 they received 55 pounds of bread per dessiatine, in the USA they received 68, in France - 89, and in Belgium - 168 pounds. Economic growth occurred not on the basis of intensification of production, but due to an increase in the intensity of manual peasant labor. But during the period under review, socio-economic conditions were created for the transition to a new stage of agrarian transformation - the transformation of agriculture into a capital-intensive, technologically advanced sector of the economy.

RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE STOLYPINSK AGRARIAN REFORM

The community survived the clash with private land ownership, and after the February Revolution of 1917 it went on a decisive offensive. Now the struggle for land again found a way out in the arson of estates and the murders of landowners, which occurred with even greater ferocity than in 1905. “Then they didn’t finish the job, stopped halfway? - the peasants reasoned. “Well, now we won’t stop and destroy all the landowners at the roots.”

The results of the Stolypin agrarian reform are expressed in the following figures. By January 1, 1916, 2 million householders left the community for the interstitial fortification. They owned 14.1 million dessiatines. land. 469 thousand householders living in non-allocation communities received certificates of identification for 2.8 million dessiatines. 1.3 million householders switched to farm and farm ownership (12.7 million dessiatines). In addition, 280 thousand farms and farms were formed on bank lands - this is a special account. But the other figures given above cannot be mechanically added up, since some householders, having strengthened their plots, then went out to farmsteads and cuts, while others went to them immediately, without intersecting fortification. According to rough estimates, a total of about 3 million householders left the community, which is slightly less than a third of the total number in those provinces where the reform was carried out. However, as noted, some of the deportees actually abandoned farming long ago. 22% of land was withdrawn from communal circulation. About half of them went on sale. Some part returned to the communal pot.

Over the 11 years of the Stolypin land reform, 26% of peasants left the community. 85% of peasant lands remained with the community. Ultimately, the authorities failed to either destroy the community or create a stable and sufficiently massive layer of peasant-owners. So you can talk about the general failure of the Stolypin agrarian reform.

At the same time, it is known that after the end of the revolution and before the start of the First World War, the situation in the Russian village improved noticeably. Of course, in addition to the reform, other factors were at work. Firstly, as had already happened, since 1907, redemption payments, which the peasants had been paying for more than 40 years, were cancelled. Secondly, the global agricultural crisis ended and grain prices began to rise. From this, one must assume, something also fell to ordinary peasants. Thirdly, during the years of the revolution, landownership decreased, and in connection with this, bonded forms of exploitation decreased. Finally, fourthly, during the entire period there was only one bad harvest year (1911), but there were excellent harvests for two years in a row (1912-1913). As for the agrarian reform, such a large-scale event, which required such a significant land shake-up, could not have a positive impact in the very first years of its implementation. Nevertheless, the events that accompanied it were a good, useful thing.

This concerns the provision of greater personal freedom to peasants, the establishment of farmsteads and plots on bank lands, resettlement to Siberia, and certain types of land management.

POSITIVE RESULTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The positive results of agrarian reform include:

Up to a quarter of the farms were separated from the community, the stratification of the village increased, the rural elite provided up to half of the market grain,

3 million households moved from European Russia,

4 million dessiatines of communal lands were involved in market circulation,

The cost of agricultural implements increased from 59 to 83 rubles. per yard,

Consumption of superphosphate fertilizers increased from 8 to 20 million poods,

For 1890-1913 per capita income of the rural population increased from 22 to 33 rubles. per year

NEGATIVE RESULTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The negative results of agrarian reform include:

From 70% to 90% of the peasants who left the community somehow retained ties with the community; the bulk of the peasants were the labor farms of community members,

0.5 million migrants returned to Central Russia,

There were 2-4 dessiatines per peasant household, while the norm was 7-8 dessiatines,

The main agricultural implement is the plow (8 million pieces), 58% of farms did not have plows,

Mineral fertilizers were used on 2% of the sown area,

In 1911-1912 The country was struck by famine, affecting 30 million people.