Who guards the Russian embassies. Publications

A little over six months have passed. Several people were arrested in connection with possible involvement in the crime. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Gazeta.Ru, the department drew conclusions after the death of the ambassador in Turkey and took measures to strengthen the security of both diplomatic mission buildings and the diplomats themselves.

After the murder of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov, the Foreign Ministry strengthened the security of employees of Russian embassies abroad. Gazeta.Ru was informed about this by the press service of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that after the tragic incident with the Russian ambassador, President Vladimir Putin instructed the department to prepare a set of priority measures to ensure the security of Russian foreign institutions. They concerned strengthening the physical, engineering and technical protection of embassies, as well as strengthening control over the operational situation around the buildings of diplomatic missions and employees of Russian missions abroad.

“After the terrorist attack in Ankara, a number of states, at our request, provided the heads of Russian diplomatic missions with personal armed escort.

Also, to ensure the safety of diplomats, the necessary contacts are carried out through the intelligence services. When potential threats arise, diplomatic missions are placed under enhanced police protection,” the Foreign Ministry noted.

The basis of the physical protection of embassies and consulates is the service of duty commandants, which is increasingly formed by specially trained military border guards.

“Russian special units are also used to protect ambassadors and employees of embassies and diplomatic missions. Such groups operate in countries with the highest terrorist threat, of course, with the consent of the authorities of the host country.

We strive, as far as possible, to expand the “geography” of the presence of such units,” the Foreign Ministry added.

In addition, they noted that local private security companies are actively involved in ensuring the security of many of our foreign institutions and other Russian facilities abroad.

Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov was killed more than six months ago. This happened at the Center for Contemporary Art in the capital Ankara at the opening of the photo exhibition “Russia through the eyes of a traveler: from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka.” The killer of the diplomat turned out to be an employee of the special forces of the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mevlut Altintas. He fired more than nine shots at Karlov from a pistol.

The police eliminated Altyntash during a special operation. On the day of the murder, Turkish law enforcement authorities detained five people, including the father, mother and sister of the terrorist. And less than a month later, the local Anadolu agency, citing the Republican Prosecutor's Office of the city of Izmir, reported the arrest of four police officers, former colleagues of Altintas. Another person arrested was an activist of the organization of oppositionist Fethullah Gülen, Suleiman Ergen, who allegedly recruited supporters of this movement from among the cadets of the Rushtu Unsal Police School in Izmir, where Altintas studied. They were charged with belonging to an armed terrorist organization.

And in March, Turkish media reported that a Russian woman named Ekaterina may be involved in the murder of the Russian ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov.

A 33-year-old woman lives permanently in Ankara and is involved in organizing prostitution. Its function is that it “transports women from Russia to wealthy men from Ankara to provide them with intimate services.” She was detained by Turkish police, and nothing is known about her future fate. It also turned out that the killer had been preparing to assassinate Andrei Karlov since at least October 2016 - in particular, collecting information about the Russian diplomat through his roommate's computer. The group that is investigating the murder of the ambassador included specialists from the Russian Investigative Committee, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The crime raised many questions about how Russian ambassadors and other diplomats abroad are protected. People from Karlov’s close circle, in particular, told reporters that he, as a rule, walked around without security, including during public events. Moreover, the problem of protecting the ambassador outside the walls of the diplomatic mission became relevant long before the murder of Karlov. On November 29, 2011, at the airport in the capital of Qatar, local police and customs officers tried to check through an X-ray machine the diplomatic mail that the Russian Ambassador in Doha, Vladimir Titorenko, was delivering from Jordan. Since current diplomatic mail delivery instructions, based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other international norms, prohibit any inspection of diplomatic cargo (it consisted of a single 1.5 kg envelope), Ambassador Titorenko suggested flying back to Amman until Moscow and Doha will resolve the issue.

Then, when Titorenko tried to go outside, about 15 police and customs officers armed with pistols and batons knocked the Russian ambassador to the ground and began beating him as he lay on the asphalt, trying to snatch the package containing the diplomatic mail. As a result of the attack, the Russian ambassador suffered a ruptured retina.

Only an emergency operation performed in a private clinic helped save the Russian diplomat’s sight. And in October 2011, Russia's envoy advisor to the Netherlands, Dmitry Borodin, was brutally attacked. Several armed men in camouflage uniforms burst into the diplomat's apartment in The Hague. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “under an absolutely far-fetched pretext of alleged ill-treatment of children,” the “guests” who burst in threw the adviser-envoy to the floor, handcuffed him and severely beat him. Moreover, this was done in front of his young children, two and four years old. The envoy advisor warned the attackers about his diplomatic status, but his words were ignored. Later, the attackers handed Borodin over to the police, and local police officers took him to the police station, where they held him all night and then released him without any apology.

However, lower-status diplomats are also targeted.

“In my practice, there was a case when I needed to come to the airport late at night and meet a delegation from Russia. Over the years of working there, I got used to the fact that there is rampant crime in the city, but I had to deal with a drunk policeman,” an employee of the consular department of the Russian Embassy in one of the Latin American countries told Gazeta.Ru. She asked not to give her name.

“When I parked, a police officer approached the car, pointed a gun at the window and ordered me to get out. When I did this, I realized that he was drunk. He decided that I was a prostitute.

For several minutes he insulted me and tried to prove that I was obliged to serve him for free. He didn't even give me the opportunity to show my documents. With great difficulty I managed to convince him that I was not who he took me for. As a “goodbye”, this policeman hit me in the face, thank God not with a pistol,” the diplomat said.

“Armed security outside the embassy is complicated by the fact that it requires the consent of the receiving party. Often, a state does not agree to the presence on its territory of an armed structure that it cannot control. Sometimes in “problem” countries, well-physically trained people are specially hired to serve in the embassy. They are given a nominal position like “assistant cultural attaché.” But in fact, he provides physical protection for one or another diplomat or diplomats. But these people are not armed, so in the case of the tragedy in Ankara they would hardly be able to protect Karlov. You can’t fight against a pistol,” a source in the Foreign Ministry familiar with ensuring the security of Russian embassies told Gazeta.Ru.

In this country there is a special unit within the Marine Corps that is responsible for ensuring the security of American diplomatic missions. In total, Marines are present in 176 United States embassies around the world.

True, the primary function of the Marines is to protect documents, including secret ones.

And only in exceptional cases do the military protect the ambassador or other American diplomats. However, sometimes they also fail to effectively protect the building and its employees. In September 2012, in Benghazi, Libya, a group of militants attacked the US Consulate in Libya. She used automatic weapons and grenade launchers. The United States Ambassador to Libya, John Stevens, was killed, along with three other American diplomats, as well as more than 10 Libyan police officers who were guarding the outside of the building.

The American media then actively criticized the Marines, who were unable to do anything to oppose the militants.

Other countries sometimes also use their security forces to guard embassies. However, they often do not have the right to be with weapons outside the territory of their diplomatic mission.

The murder of the Russian ambassador in Ankara Andrei Karlov is a tragedy, pain, a lesson, from which, I would like to believe, conclusions have been drawn. In our country, the safety of such people is the concern of the department for the protection of diplomatic missions and consular offices of foreign states of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There are 74 objects under the protection of units. These are embassies, consulates, residences of heads of missions, as well as particularly important government facilities. One of them is the Press House.

Alexander Faifura, junior security inspector of a special police battalion, took up duty at the Press House at 9 am. Will change in 12 hours. The young man and his colleagues at other police control posts (depending on the protected object) must prevent attacks on employees, diplomatic and consular agents, protect the building from dangerous intrusions, intruders planning a provocation, terrorist attack, etc.

I have observed the work of these employees more than once. They are always polite. No matter how provocatively the visitor behaves, they will calmly explain to him what, why and why. And everything is just right: tall, with excellent bearing and in excellent physical shape. Alexander admits that selection for these units is indeed somewhat different:

Specifics of the service. However, as you understand, I will not go into details. For example, before being appointed to this position, I served in the honor guard company of the military commandant’s office. Then he underwent six-month training at the training center of the Security Department in Gorani and only after that was assigned here.

Security measures at protected sites are serious. Firstly, the outer perimeter is clearly visible. Pictures from video cameras are displayed on the inspector’s monitor, and the recordings are stored for a long time. Secondly, every security officer knows his institution very well: as they say, all the entrances and exits. Thirdly, entry for local workers is only with passes. Persuasions like “let me pass, I’ll just be a minute”, “I forgot my pass somewhere” and others do not work with employees. Alexander gave examples of a couple of cases when people tried to pass through someone else’s passes:

We know all the employees by sight. In addition, when a person applies a personal access card to the turnstile, then on my monitor, at the checkpoint, the computer displays: they say, such and such a citizen has passed through. But in fact, a bearded comrade is walking. Please still use your card. Visitors, no matter how in a hurry, have their own access system. That is, we must understand who is going to whom and at what time. This information is recorded.

My interlocutor also recalled notorious cases from world practice - assassinations, terrorist attacks... He admitted that guests of buildings guarded by DO are even searched with the help of a metal detector: “People treat this with understanding.” By the way, as of this year, department employees now have personal Dozor video recorders. They will help resolve controversial situations and discipline employees even more. The management also keeps its subordinates in good shape: constant monitoring and inspections.

On the security inspector's desk are photos of wanted criminals, a walkie-talkie, and a landline telephone. There are panic buttons in the room, one of which is wireless and is always with the policeman. At night and on weekends, the building is also under the supervision of “night owls.”

By the way, Alexander let it slip that he would participate in the ceremonial march to mark the 100th anniversary of the police. It will be held in the banner group of the department. Training for the grand march of all units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has already begun.

ROSA-Eagle writes:

Hi all! We just returned from Iraq, I saw our border guards only in Sheremetyevo, picky, well-fed and insane, they looked at us as if we were fat mercenaries..., but this is a separate topic... Our embassy in Baghdad is guarded by guys from the “barrier”, normal guys from completely official structure. Speaking of Arabic script on equipment and equipment - “Rus” - Russia. Our group, this time, worked in the province of Basra, at the Najibiya station...

The internal security of embassies is carried out by the Russians themselves. According to Russian legislation, “measures to ensure the security of institutions” and “diplomatic missions abroad” involveForeign Intelligence Service (SVR) , Federal Security Service (FSB) andFederal Border Service (since 2003, part of the FSB) , andSecurity Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Security Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does:
coordination and inspection functions,
and also provides the embassy with general-purpose technical means of protection: armored vehicles, alarm equipment, security cameras and video recordings, access and control systems.
Representatives of the FSB answer:
for the protection of state secrets within the framework of the embassy's activities. This in particular includes protecting communications and suppressing attempts to introduce listening equipment (until 2003, these functions were performed by the Federal Agency for Government Communications).
FSB border service officers answer:
for providing physical protection to the embassy and its personnel.
And finally, the most important role in ensuring the security of the diplomatic mission, especially in wartime conditions, is assigned to"Department K" of external counterintelligence of the SVR, inherited to this service from the First Main Directorate (PGU) of the KGB of the USSR.

According to Viktor Budanov, the former head of Directorate K, back in 1984 his service had secret contacts with the CIA regarding cooperation against the taking of foreign hostages by Shiite terrorists in Lebanon (Segodnya newspaper, February 2000). Currently, especially in Iraqi conditions, the foreign counterintelligence service of the Foreign Intelligence Service is responsible for counterintelligence support for the security of the embassy and its employees. As before, this includes:
unspoken cooperation with foreign intelligence services, but first of all, conducting human intelligence among the population, in particular law enforcement officers, members of terrorist groups and clergy, in order to identify potential threats to the embassy and its personnel. Any departure of employees outside the diplomatic mission becomes a whole special operation for foreign counterintelligence officers. With the help of local informants, they are obliged not only to have information about possible actions against diplomats, but also to determine in advance the general degree of danger along the route of their movement. On this basis, before leaving the embassy, ​​representatives of external counterintelligence prepare a report on the operational situation in the area of ​​the upcoming trip. They also participate in determining the time of departure and return to the embassy, ​​as well as the route of movement. Based on the information they provide, a decision may be made to cancel the planned event.
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After the brutal murder of Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov, Ankara began talking about the safety of diplomats around the world. There are many questions after the incident, and the main ones are: how was the criminal able to get to the opening of a photo exhibition where the special services were present, and why were there no security guards nearby?

In general, according to the Vienna Convention, the security of diplomats must be ensured by the host country. Usually embassies and consulates are guarded, but no one protects diplomats outside the missions, said Gleb Ivashentsov, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian ambassador to Myanmar and South Korea.

“Usually there is external security from the local police, and there are our commandants on duty who guard the entrance to our institutions. An ambassador speaking in front of a microphone cannot be surrounded by guards at a protocol event, especially since usually there is no guard present afterward,” he said.

Security is provided to ambassadors in hot spots and countries with a high terrorist threat, such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. For example, in Kabul the Russian embassy is guarded by special forces, and the ambassador is followed by an escort car. To protect diplomats, Russia sends members of the Zaslon special forces detachment of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

It was created 20 years ago, among other things, to protect embassies and evacuate Russian citizens from hot spots. His help was once needed by the former Russian ambassador to Yemen and Jordan, Alexander Kalugin.

It is known that some foreign embassies in Moscow hire private security organizations to protect diplomats. The problem is that these guards are not allowed to carry weapons. In addition, each embassy has a special person - a security officer who must participate in the preparation of events with the participation of diplomats and assess potential risks, noted former Russian Ambassador to Italy and Great Britain Anatoly Adamishin: “His role is precisely to protect the ambassador, and protect not only physically, but also by finding out the circumstances, where the ambassador is going, whether there are any dangers there, and so on.”

In the case of Turkey, all these measures were not enough. After the murder of the Russian ambassador, the authorities may reconsider the entire system of protecting diplomats, says Sergei Goncharov, president of the international association of veterans of the Alpha special forces.

“The shooting of our ambassador suggests that we need to deal with the problem of the security of our embassies in many countries, in particular in those that are the main threat from terrorists. And this showed that they must be protected persons,” he emphasized.

Experts noted that ambassadors of other countries also do not have reliable protection.

Now there are Russian embassies in almost one and a half hundred countries. And to provide all diplomats with additional security, a decent amount will be required. Exactly how much is difficult to calculate. This will depend on how security measures are enhanced.
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Lavrov emphasized that several hundred FSB border service officers are required to protect embassies, but so far they are in short supply.

The head of the country's Foreign Ministry added that special forces are already working in states where there is a “dangerous military-political situation.” Lavrov cited Libya and Iraq as examples. In general, the minister said, over the past ten years Russia has been trying to attract personnel from the FSB border service to guard embassies.

It is worth noting that Lavrov recalled a recent incident that occurred in the Polish capital of Warsaw, where the Russian consulate was attacked by nationalists. As the minister emphasized, Moscow warned Polish colleagues that they should not route the procession through the embassy, ​​as this could end badly, but Warsaw did not take these recommendations into account, assuring that “everything will be fine.”

Let us recall that during the “March of Independence” a group of Polish nationalists attacked the Russian representative office in Warsaw. The incident occurred on November 11. Demonstrators threw stones and firecrackers at the embassy building. The police managed to calm the youth, two of whom were injured. Subsequently, the Polish authorities apologized to Moscow for the actions of their citizens.

In response to the attack on the consulate, the Polish Embassy in Moscow was bombarded with fireworks and smoke bombs. The police managed to detain only four people; the rest of the participants in the attack on the diplomatic mission managed to escape.